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Let me begin my remarks by complimenting Deborah for her good taste in poets. Both provide us with enough *bons mots* to be charmed into looking through the metaphorical keyhole onto the world of literature and its ways from out of our respective disciplines. I come to Deborah's paper from two disciplinary perspectives that wrestle constantly within my own breast as scholar, history and philosophy. Each has its own vocabulary but there are many overlaps. Shared vocabulary mark out points of connection but shared terms are often used in slightly different ways. So as a historian and philosopher, I have to set aside disciplinary expectations in order to listen to how a literary critic uses shared terms of art. "Positivist" and "Anti-Positivist" are two such terms. I would like to know how they play out in the discourse of literary criticism. Here in this paper the terms seemed to point primarily to competing sets of claims about the ontology of language—proper and figurative, literal and metaphoric—rather than what I as historian of philosophy would have expected to hear: the foregrounding and resistance to foregrounding of methodological matters in such a way that the fecundity of natural scientific modes of inquiry be applied to work in what in French is called *les sciences humaines*.

Via deft wielding of what might be termed "the trope of suggestive citation", ever the glory of the literary scholar, we are led to see metaphoric language as a mode of inquiry and hence tied up with our exploration of and coming to know the world (3). If we turn to the formulation of Stephen Wright referred to on page two—"when we use a metaphor, we *say that one thing is another*. We take a word from its conventional context and apply it to a new situation"—this is not a bad way to sidle up to Aristotle's account of our ever re-iterated move from wonder to understanding in the first book of his *Metaphysics*. In other words, there is a resonance between Wright's description of metaphor and its proper operation on the one hand and our noetic operations under an Aristotelian description on the other. Allow me to elaborate briefly.

The first sentence of the *Metaphysics* sets its noetic context; all human beings, Aristotle says, desire to understand just by virtue of their being human. The impulse toward understanding is hardwired into us, we might say. But to start with desire is to start too late. There is a part of the story that is left in the demi-monde of mere *praesupposita*, for desire or at any rate what might be termed noetic desire is a response to wonder. And wonder too is itself a response pointing beyond itself to some stimulus or other. In short, we encounter mystery and wonder results, caught in a first question: What is that? We have not encountered that thing before; it is not part of the world of things that we understand. In wonder we conceive a desire that expresses itself in a second question: What is that thing like among the things we do understand. Noetic desire gives birth to analogy, for analogies extend our cogitative range. Moreover, and this is the point, they do so metaphorically. They posit one thing as [if] another. Aristotle's account of noetic inquiry, only underscores our initial identification of metaphor as a primary mode of inquiry by which we come to understand what we initially encounter as a mystery, as an other, as something beyond our ken.

Our attention passes to how we might understand the metaphorical process to work. Iconicity appears to provide us an answer. Metaphor enacts a capacity of language itself to point-to and in so doing, in some way, to make-present what transcends the linguistic horizon. We say the word “donut” and the word points to something beyond the linguistic element in and through a culture’s identification of meaning. But there is more than semiosis going on. It is not just that the linguistic sign “donut” is pointing toward something that can set loose the Dionysian if cartoonish spectacle of one’s inner Homer Simpson. The claim is not just that metaphor works via signs understood in their distinction from what they signify, signs deferring for all they are worth, world without end. Rather, somehow, in the pointing-to, the linguistic sign becomes the bearer of a transcendent presence. I infer this from the importance Deborah accords to the long Eastern Christian reflection upon the iconicity of matter whereby it can be shaped and coloured in such a way as to simultaneously point beyond itself to the spiritual indeed the divine and in so doing come to bear their presence. Once again we see the metaphoric move; the icon painter posits in and through his art that one thing *is* another.

But really, how is this to be understood? We begin rummaging in our philosophical trundle box looking for our Derridean trenchcoats and their necessary antistrophe a handsome mask marked by an urbanely ironic smile. At this point Deborah introduces us to Jan Zwicky and her neo-Stoic commitment to *prosoche*, to what Zwicky calls “ontological attention”(7). Poetry stands for language in its metaphoricity. Poetry enacts “ontological attention”. Metaphor is one of its means. Moreover it is a privileged means, for the shape of metaphoric thought is the shape of wisdom.

In Zwicky’s telling, wisdom is “thought conditioned by an awareness of limits to the systematically provable, articulable, or demonstrable.” Moreover, “to be wise is . . . not to dismiss the systematically provable, articulable, or demonstrable, but to see beyond these, recognizing the existence and significance of other modes of thought.” We come to another place where in this instance a Reformationally attuned philosopher can offer a suggestion.

What does Zwicky’s “ontological attention,” her thoughtful love, focus on? She answers by pointing to “patterned resonances in the world.” Ontological attention is that attitude to existence whereby one is enabled to perceive these patterned resonances. “Metaphor is one way of showing how such patterns of meaning in the world intersect and echo one another.” The ontological attention she is interested in and by which one can interleave wisdom and metaphor, as a poet-philosopher might, is identified with a mode of perception that does not lead to the analytically provable, articulable or demonstrable, but that does allow one to identify patterned resonances. I think that what Jan Zwicky has her finger on is the world viewed in terms of what in the Reformational tradition is called its aesthetic dimension. If we invoke the life’s work of Calvin Seerveld at this point we can identify the aesthetic dimension or aspect of existence with the phenomenon of allusivity—the connectedness and fittingness that exists in things but that can only be realized in relation to a human observer, a connectedness that is neither reducible to the infra-psychic life of the human observer nor that same observer’s analytic consideration. Seerveld identified that capacity within human beings that allows us to perceive and so acknowledge the interconnectedness of things as what he called human imaginativity. It seems to me that Zwicky is deeply aware of and trying to understand the allusivity in all things in the world, an allusivity that we human beings access via our imaginativity that we give cultural form to via symbol-making. Poets,

novelists, playwrights and literary critics because they work with the allusivity of things in and through the medium of words are particularly sensitive to allusivity within the linguistic horizon, but the icon painter perceives allusive connections to be made using wood and paint, gold and a spiritually disciplined pattern of representation. Moreover, in the icon painter's case because he joins his aesthetic function to his faith function, the connections he makes, the resonances he sees bring out connections extant between wood, paint, gold, theological training and the spiritual, indeed God.

If we bend this Seerveldian perspective back onto the character of metaphor, metaphor is one of the primary ways of deploying our aesthetic eye for the allusivity ubiquitously in things of whatever kind to bring out those connections via the linguistic move of positing one thing as another. Such aesthetic play opens the world up by opening us up to all the things it can mean outside of our analytic identifications, and indeed outside of our clearest lingual representations. At any rate this might be a fruitful way of glossing what we are treated to in this ever so brief encounter with Jan Zwicky.

There is one last Zwickyian insight however that I wish to reference and comment on and then let the conversation begin in earnest. I am guessing that she is ever looking at metaphor both as a philosopher and as a poet. This is a precious bi-focularity. As a philosopher she acknowledges analytic criteria: the law of identity (A is A) and of non-contradiction (A cannot be both A and not-A at the same time and the same respect). When in a metaphor one posits that one thing is another there is simultaneously an identification and a consequent distinction, for the fact that A is A entails distinction from all that is not A. That is: the law of non-contradiction is an entailment of, is virtually present in, the law of identity. Zwicky the philosopher offers this philosopheme to Zwicky the poet for play. A metaphor contains both the "is" of metaphoric predication and the "is not". The "is not" acknowledges a remainder that is always present in any identification. Zwicky the poet imagines this remainder as a gap. The logical remainder is a linguistic gap, a keyhole one can peer through to catch a glimpse of the world beyond language. This is clearly metaphorical thinking, a poetic trope. And as such it makes a connection between a linguistic sign and its signified, or better between the signified as present in its sign and the signified as absent. As such it marks a rupture in thought, produces a silence, marks out a discipline of silence in which the revelatory voice of the world might be heard again.

This last sentence is no longer Zwicky's metaphoric; it is rather mine. It flows from my attempts over the years to boil the Aristotelian stance in philosophy down to its most characteristic intuition or insight. I put it this way: the world is a site of disclosure. All creatures have an innate drive toward self-revelation. We need but be silent and listen. But silence comes ever so hard to us. We want to be agents of logos, not merely its recipients. Silence demands discipline, and it is the better part of wisdom to spend one's life in practices—mental, physical, social, political—that create the requisite silence. Metaphor, in Zwicky's telling, is a discipline of silence and as such a handmaiden of wisdom. It is in metaphor's capacity to usher a moment of silence into our irrepressible, human saying that it creates the conditions for hearing the self-revelation of the world, its creatures and its Maker beyond language. That metaphor can do so is I take it the steady witness of poets and their literary critics down through the centuries, even down to John Terpstra, Don McKay, and their grateful critic Deborah Bowen whose linguistic interruption in our lives today has if we are lucky graced us with that wondrous instant of silence that bears to us the very possibility of revelation.